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1. All concerned with petroleum, whether in public or private enterprise 
or government and whether regarding it as producers or consumers, must 
forecast and live in the future. Significant decisions on production, 
refining, transport and use, such as electricity, transport, or petrochemicals, 
must deal with expected variables rather than present ones. In particular, 
attention needs to be paid to the determinants of output and prices over 
the next 15 or at most 20 years. Beyond that point, forecasts are not 
useful. Discounting at only 8 per cent, the value of a good decision 
(or the penalty of a bad one) twenty years hence is only 1/5 what it is 
today. And 8 per cent is a very low allowance or discount rate. For 
discounting reflects" more than the cost of money and the chance to reinvest 
it in the interval; whether in money-making enterprises or in schools or 
other public projects makes no difference" to the greater value sooner 
rather than later. To an equal or even larger extent a discount rate 
reflects the uncertainty of our expectations, especially because of the 
changes which technology will bring about. Hence excessively long 
prediction periods are a vain presumption. Or else they are a pathetic 
unwilling recognition that the policy one urges is- useless or pernicious. 
For example* if coal in western Europe were needed 20 years hence - it. 
certainly is not needed today - it would be cheaper to shut down the mines 
forthwith and then start digging them again 20'years hence, assuming that, 
in fact they ever would be needed which they probably would not. 
2. A decision must be based on some reference price of petroleum and 
competing products. Price is the decisive variable because it sums up all 
the forces in any market: demand, supply, and the degree of control or 
monopoly. A government which considers launching its own program of finding, 
/developing, and 
developing, and producing oil; or building a nuclear reactorj or building 
a hydro-electric system, etc., must consider the cost of obtaining energy 
through its new program as against the cost of obtaining it through imports. 
A rational policy must explicitly consider expected prices. This is not 
easy. Even the current price may be difficult to find. The future price 
can only be guessed with considerable margin for error. Where a nation 
has an over-valued currency, the cost of imports in foreign exchange must 
be adjusted to estimate the true costs to the economy. Even above this 
"shadow" or true cost, there may be a premium for domestic production in 
order to substitute for imports. Por example, the establishment of a 
new energy-producing industry may serve to educate its personnel, or 
confer some other incidental benefits. These supposed gains are usually 
illusory, but in any given instance may be real] if so, they should be 
estimated. Furthermore, capital may be offered for such an industry which 
cannot be obtained for any other purpose, at least not as cheaply. The 
value of this accommodation must also be reduced to terms of unit cost. 
Premia need also to be stated and set down explicitly. Some kind of 
ceiling must be calculated and set beyond which it does not pay to furnish 
the energy from home production, but instead to import. 
3. A policy of import substitution is often necessary in a developing 
economy, but it must always be applied with great care. Choosing a more 
expensive material or product over a less expensive one loads higher costs 
upon an economy which has already too little working margin. If long-term 
policy is excessively oriented toward saving of foreign exchange, the 
foreign exchange crisis becomes permanent. For if by import substitution 
the industries of the country are saddled with high costs of energy, food, 
cement, etc., export industries burdened by high costs will be unable 
to compete. 
No sector of the domestic economy should be exempted from this 
requirement: state the true cost of domestic supply and of imports, adjusted 
if necessary fpr over-valued currency, and by the domestic premium. No 
sectors of the economy are in any sense so basic or important that they 
must be provided at home. To speak of "the commanding heights of the economy" 
or the most "basic industries" is indulgence in rhetoric at the expense of 
the national income. . 
4.. The reference prices used in various countries today are much higher 
than current prices of oil, crude or products. A X962 German report 
projected much higher than current crude oil and products prices. In 1963 
the five year plan of Venezuela envisaged I960 crude oil prices or perhaps 
a little higher. The new British nuclear reactor Dungeness B will produce 
electric power, if we accept the published figures at face value, at an 
oil-equivalent of $15,60 per metric ton, The Italian atomic energy authority 
uses a reference price of approximately $16 to $17, In fact heavy fuel oil 
is available in cargo lots in northwest Europe at around $10,50 and in 
Italy at $1 less. If the authorities are right, the price of heavy fuel 
oil and other oil products "will increase considerably and in the near 
future. Projects take a long time to plan, so that the action taken today 
is determined by the forecasts of some time ago. Thus the important report 
/issued in 
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issued in 1962 and 1964 by the European Communities projected heavy fuel 
oil at about $18 per metric- ton when the current price was about $12® 
The new edition or supplement issued in April 1966 lowered this forecast, 
to $12, which as we have seen is still above though close to the current 
value. 
Since oil prices have been declining irregularly since 1958 in the 
face of prédictions of increase, it is not too soon to ask whether there 
is really any prospect that prices will rise in the near not the distant 
future. Paying a dollar too much these next few years is not compensated 
by saving a dollar in years to come. 
5. Some years ago I predicted that prices would probably decrease but 
would certainly not. increase. Since then they have- kept on decreasing. 
In my opinion, the forces which on balance have very slowly pushed prices 
down are still operating and will hold throughout the next 15 or 20 years. 
Consider first the supply factor: costs in the big producing area, the 
Persian Gulf, My estimates hold only within wide.proportional margins 
for error but the absolute amount of possible error is not great: current 
production costs are about 10 cents per barrel including a return on the 
investment at 20 pér cent exclusive of taxes. The main determinant of 
future costs will be the size of Persian Gulf reserves and the. strain 
which will be put on them. If we take estimates -of total energy consumption 
in the non-communist world over the next 15 years, and estimates of this .. 
kind have worked out well in the past, I load the dice by assuming there 
will be no< nuclear power development between now and 1975» and that two-
thirds of nori-U.S. coal will disappear in the meantime. On these assumptions 
we obtain not the most likely estimate for world non-communist consumption 
but rather the highest figure which is. worth talking about. In fact there 
will obviously be a good deal of nuclear construction, if the proceedings 
of last October's World Power Conference in.Tokyo, which I attended, are 
any indication. I will further, bias the prediction by disregarding 
natural gas anywhere and further bias it by. disregarding the chance of 
increasing output anywhere except in the Persian Gulf fields now known. 
I set to zero all future discoveries. Thus I have multiplied an improbably 
high consumption estimate by an improbably high•proportion- to be supplied 
from existing fields to derive an estimate of cumulative 1965-1980 production. 
These cumulative production figures when subtracted, from probable reserves 
in known fields exploited in 1964 in the. Persian Gulf, give us a 1980 
reserve-production ratio of about 22 to 1, rather than the existing 30 to 1» 
Thereby production costs in the Gulf are nearly doubled from 10 to 20 cents 
per barrel. But obviously these costs are far below any prices that ever 
existed or are considered likely. The upshot is that so far as demand 
and supply alone are'concerned," there is nothing to - look for but decreasing 
prices. . 
But this does not end the matter,., since the international oil market 
is not and never has been a completely free market. Demand and supply are not 
left alone. Price is also influenced by other, including political factors,' 
These have kept the price from going down faster than it would otherwise 
/have done, 
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have done, and I expect this will continue to be true, but neither since 
1958 nor today have these economic or political factors been able even 
to stop the price decline, let alone reverse it. 
6, Therefore, to plan domestic petroleum production, or hydro-electric 
or nuclear plants, with reference prices higher than current, is badly 
mistaken. With all signs pointing to lower prices, the highest possible 
reference price should not exceed today's prices. What are they? Data 
are of course scanty, and not precise. We look only at arm's length 
transactions between independent buyers and independent sellers. So 
called "prices" which are set within an integrated organization are simply 
bookkeeping entries to minimize taxes, and attention paid to them is a waste 
of time. If we take as a standard 34 degree gravity crude at the Persian 
Gulf, buyers with the largest bids and the best credit rating pay around 
$1.20, those not so well located, particularly east of Suez, pay $1,30 cash 
equivalent. An integrated company selling at the open market prices in 
western Europe and subtracting current transport posts and refining cost 
(the latter including a 10 per cent return on investment) probably realizes 
a little less than this, say around $1,10, 
These are not rock-bottom or lowest or "unusual" prices, but rather 
average or representative of what is known of real not fictitious prices 
today. Where medium size tankers are available, 55 thousand tons, they 
are available for long-term charter today at around Intascale less 51 or 
52 per cent. This means that if a suitably good anchorage can be provided, 
and these are not unduly expensive, for a large steady volume of imports, 
the cost from Persian Gulf to Rio should be around 55 cents per barrel, 
to Buenos Aires around 58 cents and even to Valparaiso no more than 
73 cents.- (Current rates to Buenos Aires are very much higher than this, 
largely because the channel and the port are so shallow and also because 
waiting time seems to be abnormally long,) These are of course current 
long-tern charter rates. In the future the outlook is for even lower rates 
as larger and more efficient tankers replace the ships now in use, and as 
ship prices go a bit lower.than the current level, which is based on a 
great strain on the capacity of the Japanese shipyards. Hence the delivered 
cost of crude oil; available to either a private or public company which 
earnestly seeks it out - for cheap oil will not simply offer itself - is 
around Rio $1,75 a barrel, which seems to be near the actual-price now 
being paid by Petrobras, around Buenos Aires $1,88 - the current additional 
40-odd cents is the penalty, for not deepening a channel in the River Plate 
estuary - and to Valparaiso of $2.03, 
7;- As for heavy fuel oil, its price is always below that of crude oil. 
This is a necessary result of the economics of the refining process, not 
of any artificial arrangements. If the price of heavy fuel oil rises to 
the level of crude, the crude can simply be burned without refining. Hence 
heavy fuel oil cannot rise above the price of crude for any but the most 
special and temporary reasons, and it is always below the price of crude. 
Calculations to show that heavy fuel oil should "properly" or."by rights" 
bear a "fair and reasonable share" of refining costs are simply a waste 
of time, failure to reflect on the economics of refining. 
/8. Therefore, 
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8. Therefore, the reference prices for domestic industry should be no 
higher than the figures just shown, and indeed somewhat lower. Correction 
if any in respect either of over-valued currency or of the premium on 
import substitution will vary among countries, 
9» In my opinion the price of crude will continue to decline, so that 
reference prices for policy decisions should start with even lower values 
than the ones just mentioned. The only way to avoid this conclusion is 
by supposing that the producing nations' will not only form a world-wide 
cartel, but will maintain,, and operate it effectively. The private world 
oil cartel of 1928-39 was at best only a partial success, and the market 
is today much bigger and therefore harder to control. 
At any rate, the subject of prices calls for the most careful analysis 
of existing observations, and of discussion among the participants, 
SPECIFIC NOTES ON NUMBERED AGENDA 
Notes on Agenda, Paragraph 6 
Past predictions of total energy "demand," more accurately total 
energy consumption, have been quite accurate, since the correlation 
between income and energy is fairly close. But very considerable mistakes 
have been made in underestimating the share taken by oil and gas and 
overestimating the share taken by coal. The forecasters were not wrong 
in their economics. But they did not allow for as much competition a,s was 
allowed to seep into the system, permitting the higher priced coal to be 
displaced by lower priced oil and gas. I suggest that this tendency to, 
underestimate the force of competition is always present, and just as one 
effect was to give more oil and gas consumption than expected, so another. . 
effect is to give lower prices than expected. 
Notes on Agenda, Paragraph 7 
It i$ . not clear what is meant by the expressions "maximum yield" and 
"conservation". (The United States has furnished and fostered, some incorrect 
concepts which are in effect the incidental result of its particular 
regulation, an elaborate scheme of deliberate waste.) The proper objective 
either of a private company or of a national economy should be to maximize • 
the present value of a deposit of oil or gas, and thereby make the most 
of a private or a national asset. Maximum ultimate recovery of oil or gas 
is wasteful. "Conservation" of oil or gas by leaving it in the ground 
makes no sense unless it is expected that the increase in the price will 
be faster than the rate at which future receipts may be discounted. The'' 
reasons for and against such an expectation should be plainly set down 
to allow the responsible parties to decide. In the recent past, it has 
been a costly mistake. 
/Notes on 
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Motes on Agenda« Paragraph 8 
Capital requirements are not necessarily great at the stage of 
exploration and production. They depend on the particular reservoir 
conditions at a particular time and place. 
The capital requirements of exploration are impossible to predict. 
They may be literally infinite per barrel where nothing is found, and 
they may be nearly zero, as was the case in most of the Persian Gulf. In 
areas where there has been some past exploration, there is some basis for 
guessing the kind of deposits that may be found by more exploration, but 
this is fairly risky gambling. 
Development - the capital cost of production - of the big Persian 
Gulf supplies is in the neighborhood of $100 per daily barrel. (Even 
supposing that past estimates have erred at every possible step, it can 
be no higher than $200.) Tanker transportation from the Persian Gulf 
to northern Europe, taking the average ton of oil carried, will probably 
require an investment of no more than $620 per daily barrel, while European 
refining will require about $400» Hence the development investment, far 
from being heaviest, is only about 1/10 of the total $1,140 even if we 
take no account of marketing investment. Elsewhere development investment 
may be $2,500 or more per daily barrel, but transport-refining should not 
exceed twice the amounts given here, thus changing the proportions completely. 
Investment factors several times as high as $1,140 have been widely 
circulated, but it is not explained just how they were derived or constructed. 
More particularly, estimates of capital requirements which average in the 
United States with the rest of the world should be disregarded. What we 
need for private or public business policy is the array of capital 
requirements figures region by region to see how much more it costs in one 
place than the other, in order that those needing to set reference prices 
will have the data they need on the competition they face. 
Motes on Agenda, Paragraph 9 
The exchange of-experience among the various parties concerned is of 
course an excellent idea, but I think it should be oriented toward each 
person, learning what can be done, rather than in averaging the good and 
bad decisions together. More particularly, for information on a reference 
refining margin, we should pay attention to the 4° cents a barrel necessary 
in Europe-today (assuming an 80,000 b.d. refinery and a return of 12,5 per 
cent after a 50 per cent tax) and not the unnecessarily high margins paid 
somewhere else. 
Notes on Agenda, Paragraph 10 
Financing of petroleum operations under private enterprise is not 
dependent on past prices or profits, but on expected future profits. Even 
high profits or a.high cash flow in the United States has not prevented a 
/drastic falling 
drastic falling off in exploration, which began just when prices had been 
raised in 1957." Making financing dependent on the receipts of oil 
companies is a dangerous slogan for government corporations. It leads 
to arbitrary high prices to let the national company seem to be paying 
its way. But if the prices are higher than the best alternative means 
of obtaining the energy, the apparent profit is a deception, and the 
economy is burdened by the losses of the nationalized company. 
Notes on Agenda, Paragraph 11-12" . 
A. The price structure of refined products is a highly complex one 
because it depends on the particular mix which the refineries turn out, 
and these vary from place to place. .It also depends in part on the available 
substitutes. In the United States, the availability of cheap coal and 
natural gas has pushed the price of heavy fuel oil far below the price of 
crude oil. In Europe, the demand for town gas helped strengthen the price 
of naphtha very decidedly from about 1963 down to the present. But with 
the discovery of large scale gas supplies in and around the North Sea, 
the tide must be expected to turn. Thus, the reference prices for naphtha 
for petrochemicals must be revised. Early in 1965* a reference price of 
$21 per ton in Europe was seriously urged. We now know that chemical 
manufacturers were really paying only $16.67 per metric ton. Hence the 
reference price for the future ought to start even lower, 
B. Current price information is difficult to obtain 'and it usually 
needs considerable evaluation to bring it to some current standard. The • ' 
one I propose we use is that of a 34° crude f.o.b. the Persian Gulf.-
C. The first source of information is reported transactions in the 
petroleum press. These may be as delivered (c.i.f.) or f.o.b. While 
nearly always authentic these reports are also hard to evaluate because . ' 
there are various terms of the bargain which may or may not be identified; 
The most important are: quality, delivery, credit, buy-back, and currency. 
When one of these terms is unknown, the error may bè relatively small, or • 
quite major. In any case, since' these are seen differently by diffèrent 
people at different times of any year, they account for quite a-good deal 
of variability. 
D. The second source of information is that of reported customs statistics 
which are published in a number of countries. The great bulk of these are 
altogether1 useless, for two reasons. First, they are not- arm's length sales 
but mere entries on the books of an integrated organization. They are not 
transactions and must be disregarded. The second source of error would 
exist even if the first did not. Even if all the price figures were bbna 
fide transactions, most of them would be contracts, and the average is a 
meaningless mixture of old and new contract prices, so that one can not 
learn prices on current contracts reflecting current market conditions. 
When prices are on the ̂decline, as over the last decade, the level of 
average customs declarations would be too high, but the rate-of year-to-year 
decrease might be too steep,.. For the rate,of decrease.would reflect not 
/only the 
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only the declining price on new contracts, but on replacement of old 
contracts by new ones. For this reason, the average prices in such 
countries as Italy and Germany are above current prices, but the rate 
of decline may be steeper than in current prices; it is not clear. 
E. Nevertheless, some kinds of published customs information can be 
used to a limited extent. Where we are able to identify a source of crude 
as being relatively free or open market, particularly if it is a consistent 
source and is consistently cheaper than the average, the information is 
worth using. 
F. Published customs figures can also be useful in tabulating the imports 
from Soviet Russia. These are real arm's length transactions. The Russians 
have always sold for as good a price as they could, though this was usually 
somewhat below the price that oil companies could obtain. The discrepancy 
has tended to get less and less, so that Soviet prices on new transactions 
are today not much below the open market level, 
G. Finally, it is possible to approximate what integrated oil companies 
realize on their own shipments out of the Persian Gulf. If one takes 
open market prices in northwest Europe, which is much the biggest market, 
and subtracts a refining margin and a tanker rate, the net is what an 
integrated company could realize. This estimate has a considerable margin 
for error. Moreover, the usual estimates of refining margins and tanker 
rates are much too high, yielding Persian Gulf netbacks which are much 
too low. Published refining margins are too high because they are generally 
based on out-dated excessive investment capital requirements. The tanker 
rates usually assumed are nearly always much too high for the same reason 
that we mentioned in dealing with customs statistics. An average of all 
contracts old and new in a period of declining tanker freight rates is far 
above the level of rates available in the trade. These errors are avoidable 
because current tanker rates can be found since there is a very wide and 
active market both for short-term tanker service, at single-voyage or spot 
rates, and also for long-term charters, which can be translated into spot 
equivalents. 
H. 1. Bearing in mind the warnings given that all figures are approximations, 
and that any single one of them may turn out to be really higher or lower 
than it appears, there seems to be a range within which most current 
transactions fall. We can conclude this because we will deal with many 
different types of sales and situations, so that an error affecting one 
will not affect all of them. Yet they come out within a certain range in 
terms of 34° crude at the Persian Gulf; from a low of about $1 a barrel 
to a high of about $1.35. 
H„ 2, The lowest prices in terms of Persian Gulf equivalent are in Libya, 
where on the basis of German border prices, subtracting current low 
freight rates, we have a realization f.o.b. Libya of around $1.45. However, 
there are also indications of some transactions around $1.35, and a large 
long-term one at $1,30. If we take $1.40 as a representative figure, then 
at current tanker rates the Persian Gulf equivalent price is about $1.05. 
/Furthermore? higher 
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Furthermore, higher quality of libyan crude because of less fuel oil and 
sulfur, under the traditional reckoning of 2 cents per degree A.P.I, 
gravity, would be worth 10 cents more, but if we conservatively take 
only half of this, the Persian Gulf equivalent becomes an even $1 a barrel. 
Libyan prices about 35-odd cents lower than Persian Gulf equivalent prices 
are a major anomaly or disequilibrium in the price structure, and it is 
unlikely that this can continue indefinitely. Either Libyan prices go up, 
or Persian Gulf prices go down. Since Libyan output, especially free 
Libyan output, is a small part of total sales to, western Europe, the tendency 
should be much stronger for Libyan prices to go up than Persian Gulf prices 
to go down, but this has not been true so far. At the beginning of 1966, 
when Libyan taxes were drastically increased, there were many prophecies . 
repeated that Libyan free prices would henceforth go up because only tax 
advantage had been keeping them down. In theory this was wrong, and in 
fact Libyan prices have shown no perceptible increase during 1966. However 
they may yet increase if Libyan supply cannot be expanded and if Persian 
Gulf prices do not fall toward $1.05 a barrel. 
H. 3. German border prices can also be shown to equate to be around $1.25 
for Kuwait crude, and reckoning at the traditional 2 cents per degree 
gravity, this makes a 34° equivalent of $1.31. Furthermore, relatively 
small amounts of crude from miscellaneous Persian Gulf countries - but 
none of them so small as to be mere spot sales or distress cargos - indicate 
prices of around $1.25. The equivalent Soviet Russian price is $1.27, so 
it may be seen that the Soviet price is no longer the lowest. This makes 
it more useful, in that it gives us a means of quick reference: if, we 
look at the latest Soviet price in any country, and bring this back to a 
Persian Gulf equivalent, this means that it is not too far from current 
prices paid to other suppliers, 
H, 4. Italian border prices seem to work out somewhat lower than German, 
but the reliability of the figures seems to be less. As in Germany, Soviet 
prices are no longer the very lowestj they are certainly near the bottom 
of the range. But this probably means that there are a number of factors 
and payments of which we are unable to. take account because we have no inside 
information, and which do not exist on Soviet sales, . 
H. 5. Valuable, information is also had by the three most recent offers 
to Argentina on .public bids. When we deduct from c.i.f, prices the high 
freight rates needed because of the shallow harbor, and the credit allowance, 
we come out with f.o.b. Persian Gulf equivalent prices of $1.29 - $1,415 
$1.19 - $1.31; $1.28 - $1.33. Again, we must warn of the relatively wide 
margins for error in these transactions, because we have had to take account 
of such factors as may vary considerably from season to season. 
H. 6, Recent sales to Brazil seem to have been around $1.70 for Kuwait 
crude and our best evaluation is about $1,20 f.o.b, equivalent for 34° crude. 
A refinery in the Caribbean reports availability of an unstated grade of 
Middle East oil at $l,60/barrel delivered, 95 cents f.o.b. 
/H. 7. 
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H, 7. Looking now east of the Persian Gulf, the official valuations of 
crude delivered by integrated oil companies to their India refining 
subsidiaries is $1.40, so the true arm's length figure must fall 
appreciably below it. Recent offers in connection with new refinery 
projects, allowance made for the value of loans to the seller, come to 
somewhere between $1,28 and $1.31. Of course, if we used the much higher 
interest rate applicable to the buyer, the government of India, we would 
come out with lower prices, but I think this would be inappropriate, since 
we are trying to find out what it is that the seller is receiving, not 
what the buyer is giving. Prices for Japanese destinations seem to be 
about $1.30; very recently perhaps as low as $1.26. 
H. 8. If now we look at the realization to the integrated producer-refiner, 
we start with the open market value of a barrel of crude in the Channel 
ports of Belgium and Holland, where something like a free market exists. 
At the end of 1966 the average c.i.f. price was around $2.05 per barrel. 
If we subtract a current refining margin, and a current tanker rate 
(Intascale less 52), the f.o.b. equivalent in the Persian Gulf is in round 
numbers about $1.10. This is of course very close to what is now being 
received in arm's length transactions, but it is somewhat lower, as might 
be expected. At any rate, it shows that there is at present no strong 
influence tending to push prices up or down because one part of a structure 
is out of alignment with the other. 
In summary, the current price of crude oil at the Persian Gulf is 
somewhere in the neighborhood of $1,20 a barrel cash equivalent to a buyer 
of the best credit rating. These are not exceptional prices, but are 
available to any large well-informed responsible buyer. Individual bargains 
sometimes are higher, sometimes lower. But this is the place from which 
the calculation of a reference price should at least begin though it need 
not end. And for reasons indicated elsewhere, I think the future prices 
will tend to. be lower than current ones. 
But even if prices neither rise nor fall but remain at current levels, 
current policies will tend to injure both oil-producing and oil-consuming 
nations* Consumer countries will be penalized by using expensive substitutes 
for imported oil (domestic oil, coal, hydro, nuclear), while producing 
nations will lose markets they would have had. Both sides will lose 
because of the mistaken belief that current prices are abnormally and 
temporarily low. And the higher the policy makers expect prices to go, 
the greater losses they will inflict on their countries. 
